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Abstract
Background: It took over two decades to achieve the removal of leaded gasoline in this country.
This was despite international evidence and original research conducted in New Zealand on the
harm to child cognitive function and behaviour from lead exposure.
Objective: To identify lessons from the New Zealand experience of removing leaded gasoline that
are potentially relevant to the control of other environmental pollutants.
Discussion: From the available documentation, we suggest a number of reasons for the slow
policy response to the leaded gasoline hazard. These include: (1) industry power in the form of
successful lobbying by the lead additive supplier, Associated Octel; (2) the absence of the
precautionary principle as part of risk management policy; and (3) weak policymaking machinery
that included: (a) the poor use of health research evidence (from both NZ and internationally), as
well as limited use of expertise in academic and non-governmental organisations; (b) lack of
personnel competent in addressing technically complex issues; and (c) diffusion of responsibility
among government agencies.
Conclusion: There is a need for a stronger precautionary approach by policymakers when
considering environmental pollutants. Politicians, officials and health workers need to strengthen
policymaking processes and effectively counter the industry tactics used to delay regulatory
responses.
Introduction
Lead has been described as "a public health problem of
global dimensions" [1]. Children are much more at risk
from lead exposure than adults because of higher rates of
absorption of ingested lead and the harm in terms of
impaired cognitive development and antisocial behaviour
(reviewed by Tong et al and Fischbein [1,2]). Recent evi-
dence suggests these effects can occur at low levels of
exposure [3,4]. There is also a growing body of evidence
that relatively low levels of lead exposure cause adverse
effects on cardiovascular and renal function in adults [5].
The phasing out of lead from gasoline is considered to be
a critical step in reducing population blood lead concen-
trations [6]. Public health initiatives to limit lead exposure
have a long history [7] but the experience from the United
States (US) and other countries indicates that the reduc-
tion and elimination of leaded gasoline has probably
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tion blood lead levels [8-10]. Given this concern about
lead in gasoline, agencies such as the World Health
Organization (WHO) and the World Bank have focused
their efforts on reducing this particular source of lead [6].
The final stages of the elimination of lead additives in
gasoline is now coming from a United Nation's "Partner-
ship for Clean Fuels and Vehicles", launched in 2002. It
has the goal of getting rid of leaded gasoline worldwide by
the end of 2008 [11].
Lead was eventually removed from gasoline in New Zea-
land in 1996. However, the process of this particular pol-
icy development has never been studied. Our goal in this
commentary is to identify lessons from a case study of this
country that are potentially relevant to the control of envi-
ronmental pollutants in other countries. To do this we
undertook literature searches and examined archived offi-
cial documents for the New Zealand setting. These cov-
ered the period 1974 (the year of the Clean Air Council's
report [12]) to 1996, the year that unleaded gasoline
became mandatory. Particular attention is given to the
period before 1984, when the New Zealand Government
made the initial decision to introduce unleaded gasoline.
Discussion
It took over two decades to achieve the elimination of
leaded gasoline in New Zealand. Table 1 highlights some
of the key events and indicates that New Zealand, in par-
ticular, was fortunate to have relatively high quality scien-
tific evidence on the hazard posed by lead to child health.
Nevertheless, it took eight years from the time that key
local child health research was first published (in 1988) to
the final phase-out date for leaded gasoline in 1996. The
lag between the US Environmental Protection Agency's
(EPA) first regulatory moves against leaded gasoline in
1972, to the start of New Zealand's phase-down in 1986,
was 14 years (Table 1). In the following sections we detail
some of the major elements which contributed to this
drawn-out process.
1) The lack of a precautionary approach
The overriding approach to the issue of leaded gasoline in
New Zealand was one of delay and evasion by govern-
ment agencies. This was frequently stated as being on the
grounds that it was first necessary to establish that there
was really a hazard. We found little evidence that officials
were sympathetic to a precautionary approach. That is
that the evidence of risk suggested child health should be
protected even if the precise dimensions of the exposure
levels and harm to cognitive and behavioural functioning
had still to be established.
An illustration of these attitudes was the argument by the
country's Chief Air Pollution Control Officer and the Min-
istry of Energy, supported by the suppliers of lead addi-
tives (Associated Octel), that a survey of blood lead levels
in the New Zealand population was needed before deci-
sions could be made on lead reduction. This was despite
existing New Zealand evidence suggesting a hazard and
the evidence that agencies in other countries had already
decided lead additives were harmful and had acted to
reduce their impact (eg, the US in the 1970s – see Table 1).
Particularly unusual was the fact that the protocols for this
proposed national study, with its implications for public
health, were initiated by the Ministry of Energy, which
even suggested what a desirable mean blood lead level in
the population might be [13]. Even when there was sub-
sequently evidence for adverse impacts on children from
a longitudinal study in New Zealand (see Table 1), this
appeared to have little or no impact on the policy process.
An early review of the New Zealand situation noted the
wealth of international evidence upon which policymak-
ers could already draw [14]. This was enough to give the
benefit of the doubt to children rather than the lead addi-
tive industry. Others at this time were also advocating the
abolition of leaded gasoline even though the evidence for
harm still involved uncertainties (eg, the British Medical
Journal [15] and researchers in neighbouring Australia
[16]).
The implementation of a precautionary principle in inte-
grated risk management in New Zealand is now under
consideration by Treasury [17]. If such a policy had been
in place in the 1980s, different decisions might have been
taken about a number of measures that would have
reduced lead emissions. These could have included: (i)
requirements for all new cars to run on unleaded fuel after
unleaded gasoline became available in 1986 [18]; (ii)
stronger encouragement of unleaded transport fuels such
as compressed natural gas and liquefied petroleum gas;
(iii) and support for alcohol blends in gasoline as an alter-
native route to high-octane fuel without lead additives.
The latter option was researched in several studies by the
Liquid Fuels Trust Board in the 1980s and there were even
trial pumps installed at filling stations [19].
New Zealand has only one oil refinery, operated by the
New Zealand Refining Co Ltd. The absence of a precau-
tionary principle was repeatedly demonstrated in its deci-
sions (in consultation with government), regarding the
form of successive refinery expansions. The capacity to
produce enough unleaded gasoline to supply the bulk of
the local market was reduced by the decision to base the
refinery modifications in the early 1980s around a hydro-
cracker, rather than a catalytic cracker [20]. Later decisions
also limited the refinery's capacity to produce unleaded
gasoline [18]. However, there was also limited flexibility
as the result of the key role the refinery played in the sup-Page 2 of 10
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Year/s Developments Reference
Late 1800s Policy: There is enough medical concern about the health effects of lead contaminated water for some US authorities 
to regulate the lead water piping hazard.
1909 Policy: Countries begin to enact bans or restrictions on the use of white lead for interior paint (eg, France, Belgium, 
and Austria in 1909). In 1922, the Third International Labour Conference of the League of Nations recommended the 
banning of white lead for interior use.
[72]
1923 Leaded gasoline: Tetraethyl lead begins to be sold for use in gasoline. Early production was associated with severe 
occupational health consequences and deaths among workers [73].
1970 Industry policy: The vehicle manufacturer General Motors announces that it would begin installing catalytic 
converters in its new models and that as a result it would be necessary to phase out lead in gasoline.
1972 Japanese policy: Japan becomes the first country to market unleaded gasoline and by 1981 less than 3% of gasoline 
sold there is leaded.
[74]
1972 US policy: The US EPA issues rules that each gasoline station has to have at least one lead-free pump. This is to 
protect the platinum catalytic converter on new model vehicles to facilitate air pollution control in general (and not 
primarily to protect humans from lead exposure).
[65]
1973 US & Canadian policy: After a growing body of evidence for adverse health effects from lead toxicity [65], the US 
EPA announces new regulations to restrict the content of lead in gasoline. Unleaded gasoline was also introduced in 
Canada in the same year (1975) [74].
[75]
1973 NZ advocacy: The Environmental Defence Society petitions the Clean Air Council on the topic of leaded gasoline. It 
is the first non-governmental organisation to campaign against lead additives [Dr Robert Mann, Personal 
communication, 27 September, 2007].
1974 NZ policy advocacy: The Clean Air Council (a government advisory body) calls for a phase-down of lead in gasoline. 
At this time the lead level was the highest in the world at 0.84 g/L [76]. Also in this year regulations were introduced 
in NZ that aimed to eliminate lead solder from canned foods and beverages [77].
[12]
1975 NZ research: The first systematic study into lead exposure among children reports relatively high soil lead levels from 
the roadsides of busy urban streets.
1978 NZ research: Elevated levels of lead are found in the blood of sheep grazing beside a rural highway.
1981 NZ policy advocacy: The Toxic Substances Board resolves on 7 August that "...on the grounds of health hazard to 
some significant proportion of the population..." lead additives be deleted from gasoline as soon as practicable.
1983 NZ policy advocacy: The Ministry of Energy issues a white paper on lead in gasoline, providing costs for different 
lead-reduction scenarios and suggesting no policy steps should be taken until the need was demonstrated by a 
population blood-lead survey. This year also saw the Toxic Substances Regulations that restricted the content of lead 
in paints used on furniture, toys, and household items [77].
1984 International/NZ research: A multi-country study that includes NZ data indicates higher levels of lead in street dust 
from a busy road relative to a road in a "quiet suburban area".
1984 NZ research review: A comprehensive workshop at Auckland University brings together most NZ researchers on 
lead and other interested parties in order to plan future research programmes.
1984 NZ policy: The incoming Labour Government announces on 3 August that unleaded gasoline will be available from 
1986 when the extensions to the country's sole refinery are completed and a synthetic gasoline plant is operating.
1985 NZ research: A study which examined house dust in a city reports "for the newer areas of the city, it was estimated 
that ~90% of the lead was derived from gasoline additives (via street dust and aerosol)...".
1986 NZ advocacy and policy: An analysis jointly sponsored by the Government and the Royal Society of NZ strongly 
urges the phase-down and eventual elimination of gasoline lead. The international evidence on costs to health is 
acknowledged by the Ministry for the Environment in an options paper. The start of the lead phase-out begins in this 
year.
[84,85]
1986 International/NZ research: A NZ scientist publishes a detailed review article on the contribution of leaded gasoline 
to blood lead levels. It stated that: "the weight of evidence suggests that at least one-third of blood lead comes from 
petrol lead".
1986 NZ research: Further longitudinal study data identifies blood lead levels in children and describes some of the 
concerns in the international literature about possible associated cognitive deficits and behaviour problems.
1987 NZ action: Leaded 91 (RON) octane gasoline is replaced by unleaded 91-octane gasoline. Higher-octane (96RON) 
gasoline remains leaded.
1988 NZ research: Results from a longitudinal study show that blood lead levels were associated with a statistically 
significant increase in children's general behaviour problems.
1988 NZ research: A study shows that the potential benefits of reducing leaded gasoline (eg, reduced engine wear and 
opportunity to use the latest engine technology) are likely to exceed any cost involved in conversion to a wholly 
unleaded fuel supply by 1996.
1988 NZ research review. A workshop on the impact of lead in the NZ environment is held.
1988 NZ research: Publications from another longitudinal study implicate various risk factors for raised lead levels, including 
residence near busy roads. This work reports statistically significant negative correlations between dentine lead values 
and all measures of school performance and ratings of inattention/restless in children.
[89-91]
1989 International research: A summary of a report to the US Congress on childhood lead poisoning documents the 
relative persistence of adverse effects from neurotoxicity and on growth.Page 3 of 10
(page number not for citation purposes)
Environmental Health 2008, 7:1 http://www.ehjournal.net/content/7/1/1ply of other products for the New Zealand market, such as
diesel. When subsequent modifications were required in
the 1990s to produce high-octane (96RON) unleaded
gasoline, these were held up, in turn, by a lack of clear
direction from government. This frustrated refinery man-
agement, who by this time just wished to know what the
politicians wanted and described the government as
"floundering" [21].
2) Weak policymaking machinery
In addition to the lack of a precautionary approach, there
is evidence that other deficiencies in the policymaking
machinery of government contributed to the delay in
adopting measures to reduce lead exposure. This was in
part because the officials and politicians were not effective
in countering industry arguments (as detailed subse-
quently) but other factors included: (i) poor use of the
health research evidence (from both NZ and internation-
ally), as well as use of the expertise in the New Zealand
research community; (ii) lack of personnel competent to
address technically complex issues; and (iii) the absence
of a single government agency which had overall respon-
sibility for the issue.
(i) Poor official use of research evidence and the research community
The evidence for the widespread presence of lead in the
New Zealand environment first appeared in the 1970s
[22]. Levels of lead in air in central locations in Christch-
urch and Auckland were consistently found to exceed US
EPA standards of 1.5 μg/m3 over a three-month period
[23,24]. Then in the 1980s there was evidence from two
different longitudinal studies for an adverse impact of
lead on child health (Table 1). Yet even with such evi-
dence there was little use of this information by officials
to highlight the threat to child health. Furthermore, when
New Zealand research did receive official comment, this
comment could be not only misleading but also imply a
lack of understanding of the data. An example came in
1980, in a reply to a written question in Parliament. The
Minister of Health, George Gair, said that the blood lead
levels of children living near the Southern Motorway in
Auckland were no different from those of children living
in three other locations [25]. His advisers had failed to
note that the researchers, from the Auckland Medical
School, had found a significantly lower mean blood lead
level in a reference group of children living in a new estate
on land that had previously been rural. Besides the group
living alongside the motorway, the other groups in the
study included one of children from an inner-city suburb
of old, lead-painted houses and another who lived near a
lead battery factory [26]. This study suggested, at the very
least, that environmental variations might account for the
differing levels of lead found in the blood of these chil-
dren. It hardly justified the Minister's assertion that:
"What is clear is that lead in petrol is not likely to be
responsible for high blood lead levels in children."
New Zealand authorities discounted the relevance of
international research by their continuing insistence that
New Zealand was relatively free of air pollution, or well
"ventilated", as one put it [27]. In 1987, the Chief Air Pol-
lution Control Officer for the Health Department asserted
that the density of motor cars per square kilometre was
low in New Zealand, thereby implying that motor vehicle
pollution was of limited significance [28]. This view com-
pletely ignored the high urban density of vehicles. There
was a similar response to Labour Party Member of Parlia-
ment (MP), Philip Woollaston, when he attempted to leg-
islate for unleaded gasoline in 1982. His private member's
bill, the Lead Pollution Control Bill, was received with
scorn by members of the governing National Party. He
was told that the bill was an example of "emotional band-
waggoning" and that "New Zealand has a remarkably
good atmosphere, noted for the purity of its air and the
clarity of its light" [29]. This attitude is still commonly
encountered, despite evidence that far more people die
1990 International research: A meta-analysis concludes that "the hypothesis that lead impairs children's IQ at low dose is 
strongly supported".
1991 International/NZ research: A review of NZ and international data reports how lead in house dust is associated with 
distance from roads and also the road type (ie, traffic density).
1992 NZ policy: Ministry for the Environment releases air quality guidelines.
1993 NZ research: This research reports that early exposure to lead resulted in statistically detectable and apparently 
enduring deficits in cognitive abilities, poorer school performance and behavioural problems.
[96,97]
1993 NZ policy review: The Ministry of Commerce produces a paper on required changes to regulations to facilitate the 
introduction of unleaded gasoline.
1994 NZ research: The sources of lead in the atmosphere of the urban environment are estimated to be mainly automobile 
emissions.
1995 – 1996 NZ policy: The Minister of Energy announces that no leaded gasoline will be able to be sold after 30 September, 1996.
Post 1996 NZ & international research: Reports detail the reduction of lead in gasoline over the period in the decade after 
1986 in NZ and associate it with declines in atmospheric lead levels and declines in population blood lead levels (ie, 
data for between 1984/5 and 1994 for declining blood lead levels in Christchurch residents [10]). There is also 
evidence for continuing reductions of blood lead levels of occupational groups involved in vehicle repairs since the lead 
phase-out began in 1987 [77].
[10,101]
* For developments concerning the hazard of lead exposure with particular reference to leaded gasoline and to New Zealand.
Table 1: Chronology of the key scientific research and policy developments* (Continued)Page 4 of 10
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from vehicles than from motor vehicle crashes [30]. These
rosy evaluations also overlooked the 1981 recommenda-
tion by the Toxic Substances Board, a Department of
Health advisory body, that lead be removed from gasoline
as soon as was practicable on the grounds of a risk to
health [31].
This history of neglect meant the decision to introduce
unleaded gasoline, announced by the newly-elected
Labour Government in August 1984, was unusual by
international standards in that it did not follow the type
of considered policy evaluations that preceded decisions
on this issue in Australia and the United Kingdom. It was
very much a political decision. This was reflected in con-
tinuing divisions of opinion between government minis-
ters themselves, and the persistence of scepticism by
Minister of Energy Bob Tizard, in particular, about the
need for lead reduction [32].
In 1986 the Royal Society of New Zealand (RSNZ) recom-
mended that the Government should explore means to
eventually remove all lead from gasoline, while ensuring
that by 1990 premium grade gasoline contained no more
than 0.15 g/l of lead [33]. It also observed that it would be
fraudulent to advertise New Zealand as having clean air.
Despite this advice, the Minister still cast doubt in the fol-
lowing month (July 1986) over whether it would be nec-
essary to reduce the lead content further in the higher 96-
octane grade. This, he said, would depend on whether
research showed such a move was necessary [34]. Subse-
quent similar comments and the observation that this was
a "very emotional issue" [32], drew a sharp response from
the scientific community. Dr Gail Irwin, speaking for the
New Zealand Association of Scientists, observed that the
Minister's remarks were inconsistent with the findings of
the report by the Royal Society that he himself had com-
missioned [35].
(ii) Weak technical capacity
The capacity within the Department of Health for inde-
pendent analysis of the issues about leaded gasoline and
vehicle fuel alternatives issues appears to have been very
limited, especially in the period up to 1984. There were no
staff with specific training in environmental health epide-
miology, though some staff had training in toxicology (eg,
the Senior Toxicologist which was a position that pro-
vided technical advice to senior public health officials).
There were also no government agencies with environ-
mental epidemiologists upon which the Department
could call upon to obtain advice. Yet despite such lack of
expert advice, the Department's position was definite and
straightforward: there was no need for a rapid move
towards unleaded gasoline. This view was publicly
expressed by the Director of Public Health [36], the Dep-
uty Director [27], and the Department's Chief Air Pollu-
tion Control Officer [28].
A key technical issue during the debate was the respective
contributions of different sources of lead exposure. Some
researchers [37] focused on non-gasoline sources of lead
and amongst officials and politicians there was a persist-
ing view that lead additives were of minor importance.
The Chair of the 1986 RSNZ Report on lead noted the dif-
fering views held between the Royal Society scientists and
officials in the Department of Health and the Ministry of
Energy (describing the latter as "doctrinaire") [38]. In
1983, for example, the Ministry of Energy's white paper,
Lead in Gasoline had stated that, "There is no strong rela-
tionship overseas between lead levels in gasoline and lead
levels in blood" [13]. In 1986 the Minister of Energy went
even further in claiming that there was no proven link
between lead in gasoline and lead in people in New Zea-
land [32]. In stark contrast to this position, a review in the
same year (by a New Zealand scientist) concluded that a
third of blood lead came from lead additives [39].
The Ministry of Energy's viewpoint was endorsed by the
Australasian Manager of Associated Octel, who described
Lead in Gasoline as "a most commendable document"
[40]. An apparent lack of capacity for analysis independ-
ent from the information provided by the oil and lead
additives industries was perhaps most clearly illustrated in
the early 1980s by the fact that government officials in the
Oil Marketing Directorate depended upon the New Zea-
land Refining Company's computer for modelling
options for lead reduction [41]. A lack of technical capac-
ity or purpose amongst officials may also explain why
there was so little urgency to establish comprehensive reg-
ulatory controls relating to vehicle emissions other than
lead. Indeed, it was not until the period 2003–2006 that
New Zealand moved decisively in this direction, princi-
pally through requirements that imported vehicles should
meet country of origin emission standards [42].
(iii) Divided responsibility for decisions
By the time that all leaded gasoline was finally withdrawn
from the New Zealand market, numerous government
departments or advisory bodies had had some involve-
ment in the process. These included the Ministry of
Health (formerly the Department of Health), the Com-
mission for the Environment, the Ministry for the Envi-
ronment, the Ministry of Commerce, the Ministry of
Energy, the Ministry of Science and Research, the Clean
Air Council, and the Toxic Substances Board. In 1984 the
Government also commissioned the Royal Society of New
Zealand to report on lead in the environment. Unfortu-
nately, however, there was no single agency (such as the
Ministry of Health or the Ministry for the Environment)
that took a strong precautionary and public healthPage 5 of 10
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how an integrated pollution control strategy of this kind
could have been developed [43]. This diffusion of respon-
sibility took on comic-opera dimensions at times. By
1990 it was hard for reporters to find out which agency
was actually responsible for the lead phase-down: the
Ministry of Energy, the Ministry for the Environment, or
the Ministry of Commerce [44].
Government ministers were often reluctant to take deci-
sive action themselves, expressing the hope that the mar-
ket participants (ie, industry and consumers, in their
view) would work towards lead elimination without the
need for government regulation [45]. This wish was to
prove naïve, with regulation being eventually required.
One consequence of such attitudes was a loss of expertise
when the Ministry of Energy itself was downsized in the
late 1980s, which made it more difficult for officials in
government agencies to evaluate decisions such as how
best to expand New Zealand's oil refinery [44].
In the final stages of the debate it became apparent that
developments in engine design meant that New Zealand,
by sticking with leaded gasoline, would be unable to take
advantage of new engine technologies and would pay a
fuel penalty as the result. This was recognised in a cost-
benefit analysis prepared for the Ministry for the Environ-
ment in 1988 [46]. Engineering and cost considerations
were thus to prove critical in driving the 1996 final phase-
out at a time when the health issues were still being con-
tested. There was never an attempt to quantify the health
costs of using leaded gasoline in New Zealand.
3) Industry power
The industry players in the New Zealand setting in the
1980s and 1990s were the manufacturers of the lead addi-
tives themselves, Associated Octel (a British company),
the operators of New Zealand's only refinery, the New
Zealand Refining Company (NZRC), the oil companies,
the Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association, and the
Motor Trade Association. The lead additives supplied to
NZRC came from Associated Octel. The principal share-
holders in NZRC were the oil companies that operated in
New Zealand and these companies were, in their turn,
major shareholders in Associated Octel. Though this com-
mercial relationship was close, the oil companies them-
selves kept at arms length from the controversy over lead
additives and it was left to Octel itself to fight to retain its
market.
Relationships with officials
Octel worked hard to establish a good relationship with
officials in the Ministry of Energy. For example, the com-
pany expressed its gratitude to the head of the Ministry's
Oil Market Directorate, Andre Milkop, for facilitating a
series of discussions in July 1983 between Octel staff and
representatives of various government ministries, as well
as the Minister of Energy (Bill Birch) and the Minister for
the Environment (Dr Ian Shearer). The closeness of the
association between Milkop and Dr David Gething,
Octel's Chief Medical Officer at the time, was suggested by
Gething's letter to him in which he asked for Milkop's
advice about the mood in the Ministry for the Environ-
ment: "I hope by now members of Dr Shearer's Depart-
ment have had the opportunity to read all the information
I left with them.....but if you could give me a steer on the
feelings of the Environmental Department I should be
most grateful" [47].
The material provided by Octel was comprehensive:
reprints of articles from scientific journals, technical
reports on emission technology, including Octel's favour-
ite technical fix, a lead trap on the exhaust, rebuttals of
reports such as that of the United Kingdom's 1983 Royal
Commission on Environmental Pollution [48], and news
clippings. There were also Octel's analyses of the health
impact of lead in gasoline, such as Gething's glossy book-
let on the issue [49]. More significant, however, was the
thrust at this time by Octel to persuade the New Zealand
authorities to change their air monitoring procedures in
order to produce less alarming data. For example, Gething
suggested in a meeting with Roger Holden, the Depart-
ment of Health's Chief Air Pollution Control Officer, that
air monitoring stations should not be sited by busy road
junctions. This advice was followed up in a letter to
Holden, in which Gething noted that these monitors "...
give high lead-in-air figures and these are the ones that
receive the most publicity and cause unnecessary alarm"
[50]. The fact that some people actually live or work at
such locations, was not mentioned.
The closeness of the relationship between the lead indus-
try and New Zealand officialdom was noted by Dr Clair
Patterson, from CALTECH, who was an authority on the
historical exposure of humans to lead in the environment
[51]. After a visit to New Zealand in 1983 (in which his
views on lead in the environment were derided by the
Christchurch Medical Officer of Health), Patterson subse-
quently wrote that there appeared to be "... an unhealthy
liaison between the lead alkyl industries and public health
officials in New Zealand... I was struck by the remarkable
similarity of the New Zealand health official's attitude and
arguments with those of officials of the Ethyl Corporation
and Associated Octel" [52].
Countering expert advice
Octel was systematic in its attempts to nullify unfavoura-
ble impressions of its products. In 1981, for instance, the
environmental group Friends of the Earth organised a tour
by Australian chemistry professor, Dr Lloyd Smythe, whoPage 6 of 10
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and its effects on Australian children [53]. Smythe was
surprised to find that, when he came to meet with Mem-
bers of Parliament and Department of Health officials in
late August, they had already been supplied with a
detailed critique of his research.
Building alliances
As the introduction of high-octane unleaded gasoline
drew closer, (which would mean all gasoline would be
unleaded), Octel sought out new allies. It predicted, for
instance, that older cars would be consigned to the scrap-
heap, which would suit sellers of new cars, who were frus-
trated by the pride some owners had in their classic
vehicles. This went down well with a writer for the maga-
zine, New Zealand Classic Car, who challenged the
"doomsayers", arguing that only 10% of lead came from
the air [54]. In another car magazine, "DBO" mused that
the information supplied to him by Octel suggested there
might be "... a hidden agenda of some sort behind the
push for the introduction of high-octane unleaded fuel in
this country" [55]. He accordingly suggested a readers'
FAX ATTACK to the Minister of Energy.
Scare tactics
Even in the final stages of the lead phase-down, Octel ini-
tiated a strong campaign to stress the health risks of high-
octane (96 RON) unleaded gasoline, which was expected
to produce a higher level of benzene in exhaust gases (as
the result of chemical changes to the aromatics in the
higher-octane fuel). This included a series of scare-mon-
gering newspaper advertisements in New Zealand and
other countries which stressed the carcinogenic effects of
this increased benzene production [56]. Headed
'Unleaded petrol and cancer,' the advertisements equated
high-octane unleaded gasoline with asbestos and ciga-
rettes [57]. Lead was described as "a naturally occurring
toxin, as are alcohol, sugar, and salt."
Commentary from consultants to Octel, and their visits to
New Zealand (eg, [58,59]) appears to have contributed to
concerns about benzene with several media reports
around this time suggested that the move to unleaded
gasoline was a policy blunder [60]. Not surprisingly, the
industry ignored the existing source of likely carcinogens
in leaded gasoline (according to the knowledge at this
time). These were the "scavengers" ethylene dibromide
and ethylene dichloride [61,62], added to leaded gasoline
in order to help prevent a build-up of lead deposits in the
cylinders. Such tactics may have had some political
impact, in that in late 1994 the Minister of Energy started
to vacillate on the leaded gasoline phase-out, citing con-
cerns about benzene and saying that "...claims by interest
groups that lead is less harmful than estimated need fur-
ther examination" [63]. The interest groups were unspeci-
fied, but there seems only one clear candidate, Octel itself.
Conclusion
From the available documentation, we identified three
likely major reasons for the slow progress to phase out
leaded gasoline in New Zealand. These included: (1)
industry power in the form of successful lobbying by the
lead additive supplier, Associated Octel; (2) the absence
of a precautionary principle as part of risk management
policy and (3) weak policymaking machinery. Given the
complexity and importance of the issues, further analysis
of the historical developments is clearly warranted,
together with comparative analyses of the lead additives
endgame in other countries. Further research to clarify the
importance of these different reasons could be based on
multiple key informant interviews and a more compre-
hensive examination of official documentation.
Nevertheless, some of the findings in this New Zealand
case study are consistent with the delays observed in other
countries that were acting to phase out lead additives
[64,65]. Similar findings apply to responses to the hazards
of lead piping [7] and leaded paint [66,67]. An extreme
example of this was in France, where the dangers of lead
in paint had to be more or less rediscovered in the mid-
1980s [68]). These laggardly responses are familiar in
instances of other environmental health hazards such as
asbestos, second-hand smoke and greenhouse gases. In
the case of second-hand smoke, for example, there have
been lags of several decades from the time a hazard to
health was identified and the enactment of regulations
that adequately restrict smoking in public places (with the
historical scientific evidence detailed in a Surgeon Gen-
eral's Report [69], and current laws detailed by Novak
[70]).
The New Zealand experience illustrates the weakness in
decision-making that comes when no single government
agency akin to the US EPA has overall responsibility for an
environmental health issue. This weakness should be
addressed directly in the course of any initiatives to place
a precautionary principle at the heart of policy formation.
Strengthening policymaking processes for environmental
health issues also requires appropriate in-house technical
expertise in central government, adequate resourcing to
resist industry pressure, and openness to input from the
expertise in civil society provided by non-governmental
organisations and universities.
Yet even with more appropriate structural arrangements
and processes it cannot be assumed that EPA-like bodies
will always work optimally to protect public health. The
US EPA, for example, refused to consider lead a criterion
pollutant until it was sued by National Resources DefensePage 7 of 10
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1.5 μg/m3, three times that recommended by WHO.
For small countries such as New Zealand, the lack of
appropriate government agencies to address such envi-
ronmental health issues might be ameliorated in the
future by drawing on technical support from international
bodies such as the WHO. These bodies can also have the
capacity to develop relevant international treaties such as
the Framework Convention for Tobacco Control [71].
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